“Sinocentrism” in Russia’s Reorientation to the East: Re-examining Russian foreign policy under the third Putin administration(2012-2018)

Author: Kato Mihoko (Hokkaido University)

Pages: 115-154

Abstract 

 Russia’s “Turn to the East” has received increased international

attention in the wake of prolonged, US- and EU-lead economic sanctions

against Russia following its annexation of Crimea. However, it soon

became clear that major Asia-Pacific countries either chose to not

participate in the sanctions regime (e.g. China, India, South Korea) or

were reluctant to impose severe economic sanctions on Russia (e.g.

Japan). Despite the sanctions it appears that Russia had gained room

to maneuver by strengthening its bilateral cooperation with China and

countries in the region. However, under Vladimir Putin’s third presidency

(May 2012 – May 2018), Russia has decided to cooperate with China

and side with China on several regional and global issues. Neorealist

theory dictates that this is a rational choice – it is better for Russia

to align with an emerging global power in the interests of forming a

global balance-of-power than it is for Russia to try and align itself with

traditional allies of the United States. While this choice may balance

power in the international system, it may also increase tensions among

countries in the Asia-Pacific region as the region becomes economically

integrated. This paper examines why Russia gives priority to

strengthening its bilateral relationship with Xi Jinping’s China rather than

pursue more diverse regional relationships following the annexation of

Crimea in two stages. First, it assesses the role of Northeast Asian

countries in Russia’s “Turn to the East” and shows how Russia’s behavior​ is 

constrained in this regard by the international system, including

regional disputes over North Korean nuclear proliferation, territorial

disputes with Japan, and broader issues with the United States. Second,

it examines Southeast Asia’s role in Russian foreign policy by focusing

on tension and confrontation between China and Vietnam, which are both

strategic partners of Putin’s Russia. This paper argues that, as a hedge

against the potential uncertainties of the Russo-Chinese partnership,

Russia still aims to maximize its presence in this region by utilizing its

military capabilities rather than by diversifying its economic and political

relationships.​